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ABSTRACT: Evolutionary psychology, memetics and models of cultural evolution focus on reproductive success. 
I will argue that fitness should in fact focus on differential persistence of entities instead of differential reproductive 
success of replicators. Understanding evolution as such shifts the nature of adaptation from reproduction to 
persistence, changing the means by which representational powers would be selected in biological systems. 
1. Introduction
 
Evolutionary psychology, memetics and models of cultural evolution focus on adaptationist 
explanations and their appeal to replicators. This view fleshes out the notion that fitness should 
be understood in terms of differential reproductive success. I will argue that fitness should in 
fact focus on differential persistence of entities instead of differential reproductive success of 
replicators. Understanding evolution as such shifts the nature of adaptation from reproduction to 
persistence, changing the means by which representational powers would be selected for in 
biological systems.
 
After briefly explaining why replication is the Achilles’ heel of evolutionary explanations of 
mind and culture, I will argue that a focus on replication in evolutionary thinking in general is 
the problem. I will do so by describing some experiments on artificial ecosystem selection 
where replicators are not an explicit part of the explanation of adaptations. By going beyond the 
focus on replicators, we will not only get novel predictions in biology, but also an understanding 
of adaptation that solves some difficulties for our understanding of the evolution of mind and 
culture. Because of the format, I can only provide a brief sketch of this view, but hopefully, the 
programmatic description offered here will be suggestive and thought-provoking.
 
2. Context
 
Gould and Lewontin (1979) famously argued against an exclusively adaptationist heuristics, 
showing how many biological traits and their current state could be better explained by appeal 
to   other   biological   processes   that   are   relatively   independent   of   natural   selection   (e.g. 
developmental constraints). However, most attempts to give an evolutionary account of 
cognition adopt a strong adaptationist angle. 
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As Buller (2005) argues, evolutionary psychology refers both to a general broad research 
interest and a specific narrow research programme (defended among others by Buss, Pinker, 
Cosmides and Tooby
1) For Evolutionary Psychology (EP), as Pinker puts it (Pinker, 1997, p.21): 
 
The mind is organized into modules or mental organs, each with a specialized design that makes it an expert in one 
arena of interaction with the world. The modules’ basic logic is specified by our genetic program. Their operation 
was shaped by natural selection to solve the problems of the hunting and gathering life led by our ancestors in most 
of our evolutionary history. 
 
If we adopt Gould and Lewontin’s analysis we can see that Evolutionary Psychology is an 
extreme case of adaptationism. 
 
Memetics, a distinct theory (Dawkins  (1976)) geared towards explaining the evolution of 
cultural entities named memes (i.e. slogans, ads, songs, etc), adopts a similar adaptationist 
heuristics. Aside from arguments against adaptationism in general, the projects of EP and of 
memetics are unsavoury for distinct but related reasons.
 
1-      The human experience of behaviour and culture seems to contradict the genetic 
hardwiring that is described by EP. The effects of learning on our behaviour weaken the 
appeal to an inneist framework. The means of inheritance (i.e. genetics) assumed by EP 
seem too rigid and too slow to account for the diversity, fluidity and apparent 
adaptiveness in response of human behaviour.
2-     Memetics has an even more fundamental problem: the analogy between genes and 
memes breaks down when one tries to explain what actually reproduces and how it 
actually reproduces.
 
These two difficulties are serious flaws (or challenges for the more generous reader
2) for two of 
the more credible evolutionary accounts of the mind and culture
3. Examining these flaws 
highlights two major building of evolution by natural selection: heritability and differential 
reproductive success (Brandon 1990, reprising Lewontin 1978’s articulation also adds of course 
variation). Evolutionary accounts of mind and culture wrestle with the difficulties of how 
heritable differences in behaviour could be passed on from one generation to the next and what 
would constitute the differential success that is necessary to obtain adaptation by natural 
selection. Difficulties in offering satisfactory explanations for this have hurt evolutionary 
accounts of mind and culture. 
 
What has rarely been suggested however is that the problem is not with explaining the 
adaptation of behaviour but in how we understand the process of evolution of natural selection 
in general. The  most  plausible answers  to our queries  about mind  and culture widen 
1Reprising Buller’s distinction (2005, p.12), capitals will be used for the latter sense. 
2See Blackmore 1998 for an informative discussion about how to limit the use of concept of meme to a more 
helpful context.
3In this paper I will treat the evolution of mind and culture as one and the same problem even though they are two 
distinct explananda (as the distinct projects of Evolutionary Psychology and memetics can attest). However, as I 
will show, a revised understanding of fitness may benefit both projects.
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evolutionary theory to include some sort of genetic accommodation, or complex feedback 
interactions between organisms and their ecological niches (see for examples  Boyd and 
Richerson 2005 and Odling-Smee et al. 2003 for an articulation of these promising ideas). I will 
now give a rough sketch of another alternative.
 
I will briefly describe why evolutionary theory needs to widen its approach in way that recasts 
differential success in terms of differential persistence (contra differential reproductive success). 
The example that I will use to show this will purposely not be a cognitive animal. Hopefully this 
will show that is not merely an ad-hoc argument to satisfy our desire to provide an evolutionary 
explanation of behaviour but rather a necessary change to explain actual cases of adaptation. 
The upshot for any evolutionary account of mind and culture will be that that the lack of 
credible replicators will not be seen as an absolute obstacle to have an explanation of the 
evolution of the mind and culture.
 
3. Fitness: population size mattered, but what do you do when you don’t have populations?
 
Fitness since Darwin has been understood in terms of survival and reproduction. Because of 
population genetics and its centrality in contemporary evolutionary biology, fitness now refers 
to the frequency of alleles, but in more general fashion, fitness refers to the differential 
reproductive success of any entity be it a gene or an organism or even for some, groups or 
species. Dawkins (1976) translated this in terms of differential success of replicators. Dawkins 
makes the case that genes are the best replicators around. although he allows that other entities 
could act as replicators but this theoretical possibility is in fact only actualized by genes and 
(surprisingly) memes,. In any case, an entity with a higher probability of leaving more copies of 
itself than its competition is fitter than its competition. Although fitness has been understood in 
terms of survival and reproduction, the reproduction story has overshadowed the survival story. 
That is why EP and memetics focus their explanations on the replicators and how they lead to 
the phenotypes  that we are interested about in this context (i.e. individual and social 
behaviours). But there are good reasons to believe that this replicator-centered story is not the 
only game in town.
 
Some biological systems (e.g. some clonal species, certain colonial organisms and symbiotic 
communities) appear to be evolving; by that I mean that they display adaptive change as a 
response to their selective environments and these changes accumulate and are fined tuned over 
time in order to increase the system’s capacity to survive. This adaptive change occurs in 
response to selection on the parts of the system. However, I argue, these systems’ evolution is 
not adequately captured by a concept of evolutionary fitness that is defined solely in terms of 
differential reproductive success or change in gene frequencies.
 
Let us briefly examine such a case and the insights it gives us into fitness. We will later see how 
a new definition to fitness might offer fertile ground for the evolutionary understanding of mind 
and culture.
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The focus on persistence has been around for a long time in ecology (often under the guise of 
stability). Most advocates of the idea that whole ecosystems could evolve quickly realize that 
persistence, not reproduction, will be the way to go. Ecosystems obviously do not reproduce but 
they do persist some better than others. Theoretically the idea of ecosystem evolution is 
interesting but the problem has always been to identify real cases of ecosystem evolution. 
Ecosystem evolution had until very recently not been identified as a likely evolutionary process 
(although many believed it was at least a theoretical possibility). Most believed such evolution 
to be epiphenomenal (Hoffman 1979) or at least very unlikely (Hull 1980).
 
Aside of the theoretical difficulties with this hypothesis, an operational difficulty in testing the 
ecosystem evolution hypothesis was a problem of physical scale. How can one go about 
‘measuring’ the evolutionary fate of a whole ecosystem? Ecosystems are relatively large and it 
will be very difficult to account for all the species constituting it and the interactions between 
them. But when one realizes that ecosystem or communities do not have to be ‘large’ relative to 
human scale, testing evolutionary hypothesis becomes much more manageable.
 
In “recent” artificial selection experiments, a good case for artificial ecosystem selection was 
provided. Swenson and others
4  (2000a, 2000b) describe three experiments where artificial 
selection is used to shape the phenotype of whole ecosystems. 
Let me briefly describe one of their experiments: 
 
They take 2ml of sediment (dirt, bacteria, etc) and 28 ml of water from a pond for each of 72 
test tubes; they are then incubated. Each tube is then measured for pH level (which was the 
arbitrary trait they decided to select on, but a good trait to measure phenotypic change in 
ecosystems since the pH level is a feature of the physical substrate, the dirt, and the water, and 
not only the micro-organisms living in the dirt). They then take the 6 test tubes with the highest 
pH. From each test tube they take 5 ml of mud and add 25 ml of autoclaved pond mixture. And 
repeat. They did observe an increase in Ph level in the “winning test tubes”. As strange as it 
seems the mud samples produced the phenotype that enabled them to “survive” in this artificial 
selective environment. And more importantly they were stable enough so that the increase in pH 
level actually was retained across “generations”
5and amplified across time. 
 
By showing how small malleable ecosystems could be artificially selected to “get” a desired 
trait they show that at least in theory, we could observe the same thing in nature. 
To make sense of ecosystem evolution, defining fitness in terms of offspring numbers will only 
take us so far. Microsystems with higher pH persisted better than microsystems with lower pH. 
The pH level is a trait of the whole ecosystem.
 
The only way for the “mud” to persist is if it changes its pH. It does so without reproducing. But 
its phenotype changes thanks to environmental pressures, and this change persists and increases 
4Note that David Sloan Wilson was the senior researcher on these studies. He has worked extensively on issues 
surrounding complex biological organisation such as groups and multi-level selection. 
5The quote signs are used here since we do not get real generations, but only forced selective events on separate 
test tubes.
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over time. There are no populations of ecosystems…
 
Again I am not claiming that reproduction is not involved at all here, but I am claiming that it is 
not the salient feature to explain the transformation of the phenotype of the ecosystem as a 
whole. Extend the experiments above in a thought experiment. Let’s say that a higher pH lead to 
slower erosion. The patches of mud with a higher pH would persist whereas the ones with lower 
pH would erode. There is natural selection here. But is there evolution? If the patch only gets 
smaller and smaller there is just natural selection. Van Valen (1989) makes a similar point: 
erosion may be seen a selective process without there being adaptation: one must not confuse 
selection and response to selection (see Brandon 1990 for a detailed analysis of this). The latter 
is what we need to have adaptations. As Van Valen argued as well, in purely abiotic cases there 
is likely no response to selection (and therefore no adaptation or evolution). But our thought 
experiment here is not like this. If the patch eventually stabilizes, and moreover may grow 
thanks in part to reproductive success of some of its micro-organisms but also possibly the 
chemical reactions of the physical substrates, AND if the pH increases (leading to less erosion) 
then it seems we have evolution by natural selection even though offspring contribution might 
not be the best way to describe the evolutionary change. To understand the fitness of the 
ecosystem one will have to understand how components  of that ecosystem (and selection on 
these components) contribute to the capacity of the system to persist
6.
 
Thoday in 1953 suggested that to be fitter is to have a higher propensity to leave even only one 
offspring in 10 to the 8 years. But why should we talk about offspring at all? If we wish to 
examine two ecosystems, couldn’t we compare their relative fitness in terms of their capacity to 
still be there in x number of years? Couldn’t we say that if this propensity (which will fluctuate 
over time) is the result of environmental pressures then what we have is evolution by natural 
selection? Ecologists have been suggesting concepts like differential persistence for ecosystems 
for many years, but actually, many cases of evolution below this level of organisation demand 
such view. Elsewhere (Bouchard 2004, Bouchard in preparation) I argue that many clonal 
species (e.g. Quaking aspen), colonial organisms (termite colonies) and many cases of 
symbioses show responses to selection that can only be explained by appeal to differential 
persistence, not differential reproduction. This doesn’t mean that there are no replicators, but 
rather that at least in some cases of evolution, replication is but a means to increased persistence 
not the sine qua non condition for adaptation to selective pressures.
 
4. From mud to mind
 
How does this muddying the water help us understand the evolution of mind and culture? What 
were the two difficulties of evolutionary accounts of mind and culture highlighted in the 
introduction? Heritability and replication. Evolutionary accounts of mind and culture have given 
explanations that were tied to the arguably implausible efficacy of specific replicators (genes for 
EP and memes for memetics).  In the context of the case we have just briefly examined here we 
6Van Valen 1989, 1991 suggests that biotas do evolve but that their fitness is to be understood in terms of energy 
control. I will not go through this account here but elsewhere I describe some of the limitations of that account (see 
Bouchard 2004 for a detailed analysis of his views).
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can see that we may not have to identify replicators at all to identify adaptations.
 
I am obviously not providing a full story here, but one may see this possibility in light of its 
possible advantages. Let’s apply the persistence model to our question of interest.
 
-         How could memetics benefit from a persistence model?
 
One of the difficulties with the memetics project was in explaining the process of replication of 
memes. Imitation is often invoked but one does not get a convincing story as to what is actually 
being copied and how. Even if we charitably let go of this shortcoming, one who would still 
need a metric to compare the relative success of various memes
7. A population of meme would 
be composed of what? In a replication-based view of adaptation, their numbers become the 
salient feature, but it seems perverse (and unhelpful) to compare the “wazzup” meme with the 
the ‘swoosh’ logo on a running shoe based on their numbers. Using probability to persist as a 
metric, we could compare the fitness of these very different memes without having to identify 
population sizes. The number of occurrences is of course linked to increased persistence, but it’s 
not a necessary condition for it (just as in nature, the number of individuals is only weakly 
inversely related to the risk of extinction). It may be better to be a rare meme than to be a very 
numerous meme  to persist for a long time (think of a super-luxury item like a Fabergé egg). 
This hints at why reproductive success may not be the best way to understand evolution in all 
cases.
 
-         How could Evolutionary Psychology benefit from a persistence model?
 
The short answer is that in a strict sense, it cannot: as mentioned previously Buller 2005 
distinguished between a narrow view of evolutionary psychology (EP) and a broader view. EP 
as based exclusively on genes to pass on adaptive behavioural capacities is not obviously 
compatible with a persistence model of fitness and adaptation. But again, one should realise that 
reproductive success is a good means for a lineage to persist. Certain human behaviours increase 
the likelihood that homo sapiens will be around for some time. These behaviours are passed on 
in the lineage hypothetically genetically and probably culturally as well. If EP can extend its 
research program to include these non-genetic means of inheritance (to include aspects of 
memetics or other theories of cultural evolution), it will become more a more plausible theory of 
the evolution of mind and culture. If it accomplishes this openness, a persistence story will 
become useful for reasons highlighted above.
 
Much (much) more needs to be said to flesh out this suggestion, but the idea remains: 
evolutionary psychology and memetics pin their explanatory hopes on finding plausible 
replicators for the explananda they are interested in, namely human capacities for behaviours 
and the apparent evolution of culture. I have argued here that the relative failure of these two 
projects should not be surprising since evolution by natural selection may not necessarily 
7Is it ‘better’ (fitness-wise) to be a meme in as many heads as possible or in fewer heads filled with less memes? Is 
it better to be a visual meme or an audio meme?
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exclusively rely on replicators to create evolution by natural selection. As long as you have parts 
of a system that react differentially to pressures from the environment and that the ‘winners’ (the 
ones still around) are there (retained, inherited, etc.) for future selection events, one gets 
evolution by natural selection. Most of the time in nature these ‘parts’ are organisms (or genes 
depending on your point of view) and the ‘systems’ are the species. Most of the time species 
persist by producing more offspring than less. But for many biological systems, success is in the 
persisting not the reproducing. In many cases of evolution by natural selection, there are no 
actual populations. This is potentially positive news for evolutionary accounts of mind and 
culture. Persistence is an intuitive notion when thinking about culture (think of traditions for 
instance) and culture is an important aspect of our behaviours. What I am hinting here is that 
persistence may be necessary to understand the adapted nature of our minds.
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